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This article explores the Cap & Trade System (C & T system) proposed by the province 
of Nova Scotia in response to the call in the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth 
and Climate Change for all provinces to implement a carbon pricing mechanism.2  The 
proposed C & T system itself and the way it has been developed offers insights into two 
ongoing debates in the governance of climate mitigation.  The first debate is about the 
strength and weaknesses of various carbon pricing mechanisms, most notably the carbon 
tax and cap and trade systems.3  The second debate is about the relative importance of 
carbon pricing and other efforts to reduce emissions, sometimes referred to as 
“complementary” measures.4   
To offer context for this analysis, this article will first describe the history of climate 
mitigation efforts in Nova Scotia, and place the current debate about Nova Scotia’s C & 
T system in the context of the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement5 and the 2016 Pan-
Canadian Framework on Climate Change.6 
 
The Context: Paris, the Pan Canadian Framework & Mitigation History in NS 
It is important to view Nova Scotia’s contribution to the national climate mitigation effort 
in the context of the global effort to address climate change. The Paris Climate 
Agreement was concluded in Paris in December, 2015, was ratified by Canada in short 
order, and came into force in November, 2016.7  It commits the global community to 
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keeping global temperature increases to well below 2 degrees while making efforts to 
keep them to 1.5 degrees. It does this by mandating all member States to set nationally 
determined mitigation, adaptation and finance contributions that will be subject to 5-year 
review cycles for global adequacy along with a commitment from States to increase their 
ambition over time.8  Canada’s nationally determined contribution was set by the 
previous government at 17% below 2005 levels for 2020 and 30% for 2030.9   
In return for having control over national commitments, States agreed that those 
commitments serve as a floor rather than as a ceiling of their efforts. The 2020 and 2030 
commitments put forward by Parties were assessed by UNEP in the lead up to Paris, and 
were found collectively to be inadequate by around 15 GT by 2030. This significant gap 
was formally acknowledged in Paris. 10 Parties are expected to make up this gap by 
increasing their 2020 and 2030 contributions beyond their current nationally determined 
contributions. What this means for Canada is that it has in fact committed to do more 
than meet its current 2020 and 2030 targets.  Given that Canada has done less than most 
developed countries to date, has relatively high historic emissions, and more capacity to 
act than developing countries, the global community is expecting Canada to make a 
significant contribution to closing this gap.11 
As a first step toward meeting its current commitments, Canada started to negotiate an 
implementation agreement with the provinces almost immediately upon returning from 
Paris. In the fall of 2016, the federal government announced its Pan-Canadian Framework 
on Climate Change, a plan that begins to implement Canada’s commitments under the 
2015 Paris Climate Agreement. The framework was supported by most provinces 
including Nova Scotia.  Nova Scotia supported it upon its release, after having only 
weeks earlier walked out of the negotiations over objections to the carbon pricing 
requirement.  
The Pan-Canadian Framework includes three key elements, a carbon price, an agreement 
to phase out the use of coal for electricity generation, and the announcement of 
complementary measures. The carbon price will take different forms in different 
provinces, as will complementary measures, which will constitute a combination of some 
national efforts and more tailored efforts in each of the provinces.  The phase out of coal 
is set for 2030, but Nova Scotia is expected to negotiate an equivalency agreement on 
coal that will allow it to use some coal after 2030 to back up its wind and other 
intermittent sources of power.12 
The carbon price turned out to be the most controversial element of the Pan-Canadian 
Framework. The federal government announced its intention to implement the carbon 
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price over the objection of dissenting provinces, such as Saskatchewan, essentially by 
imposing a federal carbon price and returning the revenues generated to the province in 
some form.  A discussion paper on the federal backstop carbon price has since been 
released.13  The federal backstop proposal includes two key elements.  The first element 
is a levy on fossil fuel sold in the province.  The levy will be based on a carbon tax of $10 
in 2018, increasing to $50 by 2022.  The second element consists of measures to price 
emissions from industry.  Industrial facilities will be granted free allocations based on the 
emissions reductions they are expected to achieve, and will only have to pay for 
emissions above the allocation.14  No decision has been made on how revenues generated 
from the fossil fuel levy are to be returned to the province.  Most provinces are expected 
to design or already have their own carbon pricing mechanism.15  
It is important to consider Nova Scotia’s commitments under the framework in light of 
what it has already achieved. Nova Scotia has, in the past decade, moved from a climate 
mitigation laggard to a leader in emission reductions in the electricity sector, while 
making some progress in other areas.16 Historically, about 80% of Nova Scotia’s 
electricity was produced using coal, about 10% oil and 10% small scale hydro.  As a 
result, electricity accounted for about half of Nova Scotia’s GHG emissions.  Emissions 
from other sources, including transportation, buildings, industrial processes, agriculture, 
and forestry were fairly typical for a relatively rural province with largely resource based 
industries.  Until 2005, Nova Scotia had made no significant efforts to reduce its 
emissions. 
In 2005, Nova Scotia began to take serious steps to curb its GHG emissions from 
electricity.  These initial efforts were codified in 2007 in the Environmental Goals and 
Sustainable Prosperity Act (EGSPA) and further enhanced in Nova Scotia’s 2009 
Climate Action Plan.17  Further improvements to Nova Scotia’s emission reduction 
efforts have been made since. Nova Scotia was the first province to impose binding 
emission reduction targets on the electricity sector, and it imposed reasonably aggressive 
renewable energy targets for 2015 and 2020. It has also become a leader in conservation 
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and efficiency in the electricity sector, largely through the creation of an independent 
efficiency agency in the form of Efficiency One.18 
By the time the Pan Canadian Framework was announced in 2016, Nova Scotia had 
reached its target of 25% renewable energy target for 2015, and was well on its way to 
reach its 2020 target of 40%.  Its binding emission reduction and efficiency targets for 
2020 were also well within reach.  Nova Scotia had also joined the New England 
Governors and Eastern Premiers in announcing 2030 emission reduction targets of 35-
45% below 1990 levels for 2030.  With power from Muskrat Falls, tidal, wind, and solar, 
and the experience gained in integrating intermittent renewables into the electricity grid, 
the 2030 target also seems well within reach.  In fact, subject to the future of proposed 
and approved LNG facilities in the province, there is every expectation that NS will be 
able to surpass its 2030 target in light of the ongoing efforts in the electricity sector. 
Outside the electricity sector, progress has been modest.  Through EGSPA, Nova Scotia 
has implemented improved efficiency standards for new buildings,19 and has kept up with 
other jurisdictions on fuel efficiency standards for new vehicles.20  No targets have been 
set for other sectors.  No policies are in place to encourage the electrification of 
transportation and heating.  No regulatory action has been taken to deal with emissions 
from industries, agriculture, and forestry.   
The Pan Canadian Framework recognizes Nova Scotia’s past efforts to reduce emissions 
from the electricity sector, and it offers Nova Scotia considerable flexibility going 
forward. This flexibility can be used to further accelerate progress, but this is by no 
means guaranteed in light of commitments to date. Much will depend on how key 
elements, such as the equivalency agreement on coal and the Cap and Trade system, are 
implemented, and whether they are supported by further regulatory action and incentives 
to complete transition from fossil fuels to renewables.  The role of the proposed C & T 
system in accelerating the transition toward GHG emission neutrality is considered 
below. 
 
The Proposed NS C & T System 
The government of Nova Scotia released a discussion paper on its proposed Cap and 
Trade (C & T) System for provincial GHG emission reductions in the spring of 2017.21  
The discussion paper outlines the key design elements of the proposed C&T system.  As 
discussed below, it is largely designed to meet the minimum requirements of the carbon 
pricing mechanisms set out in the Pan-Canadian framework while minimizing the impact 
on covered sectors.  As currently proposed, it will have limited impact on GHG emissions 
in Nova Scotia. 
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C & T systems work by setting limits on facilities collectively rather than individually 
and allowing trading between facilities to encourage emissions to happen where they are 
least expensive. The basic elements of the system are the overall limit for facilities that 
are included in the system (the overall cap for captured facilities), a distribution of the 
right to emit up to the limit (allocation), and the right of captured facilities to trade 
allocations. Captured facilities are facilities which will be included under the C & T 
System.  
Prospective captured actors under the Nova Scotian system include suppliers of fossil 
fuels, the electricity sector, and large industrial emitters with emissions above 100,000 
tons per year.   The system is expected to capture less than 20 different actors, made up of 
suppliers of transportation and heating fuel in the province, Nova Scotia Power, and a 
few very large industrial emitters.  The focus on upstream facilities reduces the 
administrative cost of the system, but also limits the number of emission reduction 
options likely to be motivated through its implementation.22   
Fuel suppliers, for example, will not be motivated to encourage any reduction in the 
consumption of the products they sell, and can in fact be expected to do everything within 
their power to prevent their customers from taking action to reduce consumption of their 
product. They can be expected to purchase the cheapest credits available, and may or may 
not pass on some of the cost to their consumers, depending on market conditions and 
regulations.23 
Both combustion and process emissions from captured facilities are covered, but fugitive 
emissions are not.24 Methane emissions from leaks in natural gas pipelines, for example, 
would not be captured.  The system is expected to capture about 90% of emissions in 
Nova Scotia, excluding most notably fugitive methane emissions from agriculture and oil 
and gas operations.  Non-covered sectors, such as agriculture and forestry, cannot 
participate voluntarily, but will be permitted to sell offset credits into the cap and trade 
system.  Protocols for the certification of credits from these sectors are to be approved (if 
suitable protocols are found to exist) or developed by the province. 
A key outstanding issue is the allocation of proportions of the cap to captured facilities.  
The province has yet to finalize the caps to be set for each of the sectors or actors.  The 
sector caps are to be negotiated with Environment Canada based on modeling of the 
emission reductions expected in each covered sector from a carbon price of $10 in 2018 
increasing to $50 by 2022.  For Nova Scotia Power, the cap is to be pre-set at the 
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emission reductions the utility will achieve under current regulatory requirements to 
reduce GHG emissions and its legislated renewable energy targets.25   
Once the cap for each covered sector is settled with Environment Canada, the province 
will have its overall cap for each of the first 5 years of the operation of the cap and trade 
system.  It will then decide how much of the overall cap it will allocate to each sector or 
facility.  The province has not committed to any particular methodology for this 
allocation,26 but has indicated that it intends to allocate emission permits for free rather 
than to auction them,27 as is the case in Ontario.28  Assuming the overall caps negotiated 
with Environment Canada provide for meaningful emission reductions in the first 5 years, 
the allocation to captured facilities will be important, as it will determine what share of 
emissions from each facility or operation are free.  For example, an allocation based on 
historical emissions would tend to favour heating oil over natural gas, as the latter is 
relatively new in the province and its market share is still small.  If the province intends 
to encourage fuel switching from oil to natural gas and electricity, allocation based on 
historical emissions would not be appropriate.29  Similar issues arise with transportation. 
The C & T system will allocate caps and credits annually.  To provide flexibility to 
captured facilities, the system will have three-year compliance periods.  The system will 
allow banking of extra credits for future compliance periods, but borrowing from future 
compliance periods is not contemplated.  The three-year compliance periods and banking 
will allow facilities some opportunity to adjust to unexpected increases in emissions.  
This flexibility will be critical, as the system is not intended to be linked with C & T 
systems in other provinces, at least not initially.30   
It is important to point out, in this regard, that the system will have important design 
features that are different from the system being implemented in Ontario and Quebec, 
both of which are based on and either  already linked or to be linked with the Western 
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Climate Initiative.31  For example, the threshold for industrial facilities for jurisdictions 
who are part of the Western Climate Initiative is 25,000 tons, compared to 100,000 tons 
in Nova Scotia.32  The design differences may make it more difficult to link to these 
jurisdictions in the future. 
 
Assessment of NS’s Proposed C & T System 
A complete assessment of the proposed C & T system is not possible until the overall cap 
for Nova Scotia is negotiated with Environment Canada, the allocation to captured 
facilities is finalized, and the protocols for agriculture and forestry are announced.  There 
are, however, elements of the proposed system that give rise to concerns about its 
effectiveness.   
The free allocation of allowances to all facilities is perhaps the most serious shortcoming 
of the proposed system.  Free allocation risks offering a windfall to captured facilities and 
may reduce the financial incentive to reduce emissions.  It may also reduce the price 
signal that will be passed down from the captured upstream actors to consumer, reducing 
the financial incentive of consumers to make choices that reduce emissions. It may 
furthermore hinder the entry into the market by competitors, potentially reducing 
economic prosperity.  Most importantly, free allocation means there are no additional 
revenues available to improve the effectiveness and fairness of the overall effort to 
reduce GHG emission in Nova Scotia through the implementation of complementary 
measures, and to support economic development associated with the transition.   
The second major concern with the proposed C & T system is that it appears that there 
will be three sources of GHG emission reduction credits that have the potential to flood 
the system with cheap credits, eliminating any incentive for the fundamental transition 
that needs to happen, particularly in the transportation and building sectors.  One 
potentially significant source of cheap credits is Nova Scotia Power.  The cap on the 
electricity sector is based on current regulatory requirements.  It seems clear that more 
can be done in this sector, likely at a more reasonable cost than other covered sectors.  It 
seems likely that Nova Scotia Power will have surplus credits to sell, potentially at a 
large scale.  Agriculture and forestry are the other two sources of potentially large 
volumes of cheap offset credits.  Depending on the protocols that will be adopted, both 
have the potential to sell significant credits into the system.  Unless stringent protocols 
are negotiated, it is reasonable to expect that these offset credits will be cheap, and a 
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portion of the credits will be granted for business as usual emission reduction efforts.33 
This certainly has been the experience elsewhere, including with respect to the Clean 
Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol.34  
The focus of the system on a few upstream actors, while administratively efficient, does 
have significant implications for the proposed C & T system, particularly in combination 
with the decision not to link to other jurisdictions.  On its face, this approach could create 
challenges for new industrial actors.  In the absence of another solution in the discussion 
paper, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this problem will be addressed by 
designing the system to be sufficiently lax that it can accommodate new emitters without 
penalizing them so heavily that they are discouraged from coming to Nova Scotia.   
Space for new entrance could be secured through a combination of generous overall caps 
and generous protocols for forestry and agriculture, resulting in an abundant supply of 
cheap credits.  If this does not happen, new industries with significant emissions will 
likely be deterred from locating in Nova Scotia.35  Of course, linking to other systems or 
a carbon tax in place of the C & T system would be effective ways of addressing this 
problem without undermining the environmental objective.  
The focus on a few upstream actors also reduces the opportunity to motivate downstream 
actors to take measures to reduce emissions.  Fuel suppliers will not be motivated to take 
measures to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels, thought some downstream price 
impact would be expected.  Imposing a cap on fuel suppliers will encourage them to buy 
cheap credits and minimize the impact of the C & T system on their customers. 
 
Key Debates on Climate Mitigation Governance 
It is important to consider the proposed NS C & T system in the context of the broader 
debates about effective carbon pricing and its role in the regulation of GHG emissions.  
These debates are ongoing both in Canada and in other jurisdictions.  There are two key 
elements to this debate.  One is the debate about the most effective carbon pricing 
mechanism, a debate that has focused largely on C & T systems and carbon taxes.36  The 
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second element is the debate about the relative contribution or appropriate combination of 
carbon pricing and complementary measures.37   
An emerging part of this debate is the compatibility of carbon pricing with some other 
measures.  For example, as Driesen points out, a cap and trade system that offers 
generous allocations to coal burning power plants followed by a decision to phase out 
coal can lead to undesired consequences that undermine the economic and environmental 
benefits of the subsequent coal phase out.38  Essentially, the phase out of coal would 
leave the owners of the coal plants with allocations they can sell at a profit into the 
system, resulting in a disincentive for other captured facilities to reduce their own 
emissions. 
The debate over C & T versus carbon taxes was initially a debate around the control of 
the price versus control over the environmental goal in the form of the overall cap on 
emissions.  Those advocating for a carbon tax tended to be concerned about the economic 
impact of setting a limit on emissions without knowing the cost of meeting those limits.  
Those advocating for a C & T system over a carbon tax tended to be concerned that the 
environmental benefits that could be achieved with a given carbon price was difficult to 
predict with any accuracy. A C & T system was considered to offer more predictable 
environmental benefits.39 
A number of things have changed in this debate in recent years.  First, in the context of 
GHG emissions, the cost of mitigation is much better understood, meaning that it is much 
easier to estimate the cost of meeting a certain emissions cap.  We also are better able to 
estimate the emission reductions that can be achieved with a given price on carbon, 
making it easier to estimate the environmental impact of a given carbon tax.40   
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the design of carbon taxes and C & T 
systems have become much more nuanced over time, resulting in the blurring of the lines 
between carbon taxes and C & T systems.  By setting minimum and maximum prices in a 
C & T system, for example, a well-designed cap and trade system can function more like 
a carbon tax, both in terms of offering price certainty and in terms of creating uncertainty 
in the environmental benefits achieved. 
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The more general debate over the role of carbon pricing in climate mitigation centers 
around a few key elements.  One area of divergence is about the relative value of carbon 
pricing.  The main value of carbon pricing is that it tends to reduce the cost of mitigation.  
However, this comes at the cost of losing control over where the emission reductions take 
place.  The value of more directed measures is that they ensure that mitigation efforts 
happen where there are opportunities to take advantage of co-benefits and for integrated 
solutions that address climate change without creating other sustainability challenges. At 
the heart of the debate is whether the priority is to reduce emissions at the lowest cost, or 
whether it is more important to control where the emission reductions are achieved, so 
that there are opportunities to maximize collateral economic, social and environmental 
benefits and minimize negative consequences of specific emission reduction measures.  
Another, related area of debate is about the need for and value of measures to 
complement carbon pricing.  There is a general recognition that in order for carbon 
pricing to be effective, societal actors must have alternatives to their current behaviour.  
Different views on the role of governments to create such alternatives are often 
underlying debates about the role of complementary measures to support carbon pricing 
in achieving emission reductions.  Should governments invest in specific alternatives or 
should this be left to the private sector?41  Should governments regulate the elimination of 
some options, or should this be left to be worked out through the carbon pricing 
mechanism?42   
An example where these issues are playing out is in the transportation sector.  The role of 
government in developing infrastructure for public transportation, active transportation 
and the electrification of vehicular transportation are among the issues to be resolved. 
How these issues are resolved will determine the relative role of carbon pricing versus 
complementary measures in facilitating the transition of the transportation sector to GHG 
neutrality.  Will the transition to electric vehicles happen without government investment 
in charging stations and subsidies for the purchase of electric cars?  What government 
measures are needed to ensure that active and public transportation will be viable options 
for individuals facing the higher cost of gasoline as a result of a carbon price?  
The proposed NS C & T System’s environmental integrity in terms of GHG emission 
reductions will largely hinge on the limits being negotiated with Environment Canada 
and the protocols to be adopted for offsets from agriculture and forestry.  The broader 
integrity of the proposed system, in terms of its ability to facilitate an overall transition to 
GHG neutrality in a manner that is equitable, particularly to vulnerable populations, is 
very much an open question. The answer depends largely on appropriate complementary 
measures to ensure the broader goals beyond low cost short-term emission reductions are 
met.  
It seems clear that in the transportation sector, the proposed system will do little more 
than result in a marginal increase in the price of gasoline.  This may encourage some 
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Nova Scotians to drive less, but without significant efforts to enhance public and active 
transportation alternatives, many Nova Scotians, especially in rural parts of the province, 
will have little choice but to keep driving.  Without investment in charging stations and 
some financial support for the purchase of electric vehicles, the only reasonable 
transportation option for most Nova Scotians will remain the gasoline car.  This is 
particularly important from an equity perspective, as rural residents will not have access 
to effective public transportation options.  Reductions from the C & T system alone will 
be marginal and, most importantly, will not be transformational or equitable.   
Similar challenges exist in the building sector, where the proposed C & T system alone 
will do little to transform the build environment to more sustainable, GHG emission 
neutral sources of heating and cooling, and more energy efficient construction.  An 
increase in the cost of fossil fuel based energy will be helpful, but much more needs to be 
done to make this transition.  For example, decisions about the effort and investment into 
the energy efficiency of a new building and its sources of energy are often made by 
builders who don’t bear the cost of operation and maintenance, including the cost of fuel 
or of future building upgrades.  This and similar disconnects between the price signal of 
even an effective carbon price threatens to undermine the price incentive of the carbon 
price in encouraging better building design.  Well designed and implemented 
complementary measures will be critical to achieving the transition to GHG emission 
neutrality in the building sector.43 
The proposed C & T system serves to highlight a few of the limitations of carbon pricing, 
and the risks associated with choosing a C & T system as the pricing mechanism.  Nova 
Scotia has achieved progress in the electricity sector using regulatory approaches, so far 
without a carbon price.  In some of the key sectors, such as buildings and transportation, 
the price signal alone will not be enough to facilitate the further transition that is clearly 
needed.  Finally, the proposed C & T system illustrates the challenge of designing a 
principled pricing mechanism in a political context where the driving forces are not the 
effectiveness of the mechanism but the economic impact it will have on powerful 
economic actors.  The next section explores what a principled design of a cap and trade 
system might take into account.  This is done in an effort to illustrate the hidden choices 
in the design proposed by the province of Nova Scotia. 
 
Principled System Design 
One of the challenges of implementing a C & T system is that it will affect a wide range 
of actors, and if it is going to have an impact in facilitating a transition of the scale 
required to address climate change, it must affect some powerful actors significantly. As 
a result, any carbon pricing mechanism designed by any government will be subject to 
political pressures from powerful actors.   
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A particular challenge in this regard is that it is often the most powerful actors that have 
to be most challenged to change, while the sectors that stand to benefit economically 
from the transition are often still emerging and therefore tend to have less power and 
influence.  In this context, the best hope of designing an effective C & T system is a 
principled and transparent approach. The C & T system’s design must be founded on 
fundamental principles that ensure we act in the best interest of society as a whole rather 
than in the interest of the status quo or in the interest of selected powerful actors.  This 
section explores some principles that might guide the design of an effective carbon 
pricing mechanism. 
A key element of a principled approach would be not to treat all sectors of the economy 
the same when designing the system.  By recognising differences, it is then possible to 
base key design choices, such as the manner of allocation, the volume of allowances, and 
the transition from short, to medium to long term, on principles that enhance the 
effectiveness of the system rather than on political power and influence.  Among the 
principled design questions are the following: 
● How significant is the cost of the carbon pricing mechanism in the overall cost 
of the product or service being provided by the sector? 
● Is the sector likely to pass on the cost of the carbon pricing mechanism, thus 
passing on the impact to the user of the product or service? 
● Is the sector likely to internalize the cost of the carbon pricing mechanism, thus 
reducing the profitability of the sector? 
● How important is the sector in terms of employment? 
● How important is the sector in terms of government revenues from taxes and 
royalties? 
● Does the sector have opportunities to thrive and grow through the transition to 
GHG neutrality? 
● Is the sector likely to be part of a GHG emission neutral economy? 
● Does the sector provide an essential product or service? 
● Is the sector vulnerable to competition from abroad (either in the domestic 
market or export market)? 
● How significant is the cost of supporting or favouring this sector, compared with 
other sectors considered in the system? 
● What are the equity considerations of this sector being changed or affected by 
the system? 
 
Under a principled approach proposed here, these design questions would be asked for 
each of the key sectors in Nova Scotia, including electricity, the fossil fuel sector, 
transportation, buildings, manufacturing, mining, agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.  This 
type of analysis would allow for a design that is informed by an understanding of which 
sectors are legitimately trade-exposed, which sectors will pass on the carbon price to 
users, which sectors are in need of some protection in the short term, which sectors are 
worth supporting in the medium term, and which sectors, end users and workers are in 
need of protection and assistance through the transition to GHG emission neutrality.   
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The analysis might start with three categories of sectors.  First, there will be sectors, such 
as the exploration and distribution of fossil fuels, that are important today, but will likely 
not be part of a GHG neutral future.  Second, there are many sectors, such as electricity, 
buildings, transportation, agriculture, forestry, manufacturing, and mining, that will be 
part of the GHG neutral economy of the future, but that will have to undergo significant 
transitions to become carbon neutral.  Third, there are sectors, such as renewable energy, 
green building design, smart grid and energy storage technologies, sustainable agriculture 
and forestry, and others that have great potential to be a growing part of our economy 
because they offer solutions to the global challenge of transitioning to GHG neutrality. 
Some work has already been done on these issues.  A 2015 report of the Ecofiscal 
Commission, for example, considered how trade-exposed various sectors of Nova 
Scotia’s economy are.44  It concluded that only a few are significantly trade exposed.  
Experience with BC’s carbon tax has been invaluable in helping to understand economy 
wide implications of carbon pricing.45  The experience can also help to identify which 
end users and workers will need protection because the carbon price is passed on to those 
who would be unfairly affected by it. 
The end result of such an approach, based on existing analysis such as the 2015 report of 
the Ecofiscal Commission, would likely be that most sectors should be included in the C 
& T system (including agriculture, forestry, and fugitive emissions).  It would likely 
conclude that most actors should not be granted free allocations, but should either be 
auctioned or sold at a fixed price that will increase over time.46  It would likely conclude 
that the very gradual reduction of the caps and the efforts underway in many other 
jurisdictions in North America and around the world will limit the risk of trade exposure.   
The analysis would identify those specific actors that need protection, it would be 
transparent about the unique circumstances that warrant special treatment and for how 
long.  Furthermore, the analysis would identify the end users and workers in need of 
protection.  The revenues generated from the allocation of allowances would be available 
to deal with those legitimate equity concerns without giving a free ride to others who 
either have alternatives or the resources to internalize the cost of the GHG emissions their 
choices represent. 
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A final group of design issues considered here is which sectors should be included in the 
C & T system, which should be left out, and which should be permitted to sell offset 
credits into the system.  Under the current proposal, agriculture and forestry would be 
permitted to sell credits into the system, and fugitive emissions would be excluded from 
the system.47  The main rationale for their exclusion appears to be methodological and 
administrative challenges associated with their inclusion.  Of course, similar challenges 
exist with the establishment of appropriate protocols to ensure credits have environmental 
integrity.  A key challenge with the consideration of offsets from forestry and agriculture 
is that there is a significant risk that these sectors will flood the system with large 
volumes of potentially very cheap credits, thus undermining any incentive for other 
sectors to reduce emissions.  Estimating the volume of credits available from each offset 
sector and reflecting it in the overall cap would be protect against this risk.  In other 
words, the availability of offsets should result in a reduction of allowances made 
available through the cap.  This approach would reduce concern that the offset protocols 
could undermine the environmental integrity of the C & T system.48 
Conclusion 
The Nova Scotia C & T System, as proposed, is unlikely to have much, if any impact on 
either short-term GHG emission reductions in Nova Scotia, or in facilitating a transition 
to GHG emission neutrality.  The large thresholds for industrial facilities will exempt all 
but a few large facilities.  The electricity sector is protected due to past efforts and current 
regulations.  Other actors captured are likely to purchase credits and pass on the cost. 49  
The price of credits is likely to be low, due to cheap credits from the power sectors, 
agriculture and forestry.   
The proposed system is a product of a political process that has resulted in the protection 
of powerful sectors of the current Nova Scotia economy rather than on a principled 
design to protect economically important trade-exposed sectors, while pushing the rest of 
the economy gradually but firmly in the direction of GHG neutrality, protecting only 
those in need of protection.  This article has explored elements of a more principled 
approach to the design of Nova Scotia’s carbon pricing mechanism. It has also 
highlighted the critical importance of making the carbon pricing mechanism an integral 
part of an overall strategy for the transition to GHG neutrality.   
The Paris Climate Agreement challenges jurisdictions around the world to move from 
their past tentative steps toward GHG neutrality to designing and implementing a 
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coherent, comprehensive strategy for this transition.  A well-designed carbon pricing 
mechanism has the potential to be an important part of this overall strategy. That 
mechanism must have a principled design and effective integration with other measures 
to ensure the price signal serves to encourage effective, legitimate alternatives. 
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